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Abstract 
Low carbon transitions have been predominantly analysed using quantitative methods, mostly building on 
present and forecasted data of social metabolism. This paper addresses both the economic and social 
dimensions of low carbon emissions by analysing the presence of socio-environmental conflicts in Germany. 
These conflicts appear to be a consequence of unsustainable policies targeting firms’ planning and behaviour, 
mainly based on neoclassical economic thinking and stakeholders unwilling to accept carbon intensive 
behaviour. By applying a Delphi Method with 18 experts, the authors analyse 117 socio-environmental 
conflicts (e.g. derived from extractive activity, energy production, and infrastructure projects) in Germany. 
Most of these conflicts include the struggle of various society groups to achieve a low carbon economy but 
also a more equitable society. The analyses presented in this paper shows that Germany provides both the best 
and the worse of achieving low carbon paths: a significant investment into renewable energy, but also a strong 
dependency on lignite which supplies the most polluting power stations of Europe. By addressing the problem 
from an historical perspective, the authors demonstrate how carbon intensive extractive activity has been one 
of the major causes for environmental activism and protest in both socialist and capitalist societies. 
 
Highlights: 
 
German energy transition raises questions of equitability as energy poverty has increased 
 
Green Economy focus favours mega projects as high voltage power lines 
 
Despite ambitious goals, Germany (so far) has remained a high-carbon economy 
 
Extraction activities targeting lignite had been dominant in both socialist and post-socialist Germany 
 
The Vattenfall’s divestment from Lusatian Lignite is presented as a case of corporate degrowth 
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1. Introduction 
The “Green Economy” manifesto, launched during the Rio+20 summit in 2014, addresses growth in income 
and employment which is “driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and 
pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services” (UNEP, 2011 p.16). Germany ranks first in the so called Green Economy Perception Index 
(Tamanini, 2014). German policymakers tend to associate a greener economy with the transition towards a 
low-carbon economy (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2014). Particularly with the 
“Energiewende” (“Energy Turnaround”) project, the German government has taken a quite radical approach 
with the aim to change the country’s energy supply by withdrawing from nuclear energy and mostly relying 
on renewable energies. However, Kunze and Becker (2014) argue that energy transformations regularly 
generate and bring together social movements opposing opencast mining, fracking and energy poverty. These 
movements tend to ally with local groups frequently promoting and campaigning in favour of renewable 
energy in socio-environmental conflicts which  arise from structural inequalities related to income and power-
supply. These conflicts affect the environment as well as people’s wellbeing at regional and sub-regional 
levels, pushing local communities to organise massive protests in order to preserve their physical environment 
and quality of life (EJOLT 2016). 
 
Although small-sized renewable energy projects may awake environmental consciousness, broader 
initiatives targeting energy transformations can divert vast segments of German society from focusing on the 
main causes of any ecological crisis. For instance, a large number of conflicts related to fossil fuels and climate 
justice/energy, together to other conflicts related to the transition to ‘greener economies’, cast some doubts 
about whether the Energiewende project will ever contribute to curb negative environmental effects associated 
with power generation. Four out the five European most polluting power stations in terms of CO2 emissions 
are lignite power stations located in Germany. Lignite is abundant in Germany: since the industrial revolution, 
it remains the only raw material for energy production in the country which does not need to be imported. In 
2013, Germany mined 183 million tons of lignite, followed by China (147 million tons), Russia (73 million 
tons), and the USA (70 million tons; Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Bund 2015). Lignite is extracted intensively in 
the Rhenish mining area (North Rhine-Westphalia), in the Lusatian mining area (southeast of Brandenburg), 
in northeast and northwest Saxony. The reserves of lignite in these four major German areas mining amount 
to approximately 40 billion tons: only Russia (91 Billion tons) and Australia (44 Billion tons) have larger 
reserves.  
 
1.1. Goals and objectives 
 
The study we present in this paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate about low-carbon transitions, 
addressing how ecological conflicts characterise the passage from fossil-fuel economy to a low-carbon 
economy in Germany. In many socio-environmental conflicts, different stakeholders appear to have a more 
sustainable perspective of the (low-carbon) economy than proponents of practices focusing on the use of 
environmentally intensive resources. We aim to investigate why and how broad coalitions of stakeholders in 
Germany engage in societal battles aimed at decarbonizing the economy associated with the production of 
energy. In doing so, we examine a broad spectrum of socio-environmental conflicts, providing an in-depth 
account of the conflicts occurring in many carbon intensive lignite mining areas. 
 
Our analysis draw on several sustainability related literature streams discussed in the Journal of Cleaner 
Production such as low-carbon economy (Jin et al. 2014; Robertson, 2015; Zhang et al., 2015). Jin et al. (2014), 
while investigating the impact of the most common carbon policies, such as carbon emission tax, inflexible 
cap, and cap-and-trade; found that significant carbon reductions within energy economies could only be 
achieved by applying a high carbon tax rate, a high carbon price, and/or a very strict carbon cap. However, 
according to Robertson (2015, p???),  “even accepting the premise that society may agree conceptually as to 
the most suitable form its sustainable future should adopt, entrenched divisions within the same society as to 
the underlying causes of un-sustainability and the like divisions as to the appropriate remedial actions required 
to achieve sustainability will most probably result in any consensus on the issue of sustainability remaining 
elusive, if not impossible to achieve”. More optimistically, Zhang et al. (2015) conclude that a transition to a 
low carbon economy is possible, using China as example: the largest CO2 emitting country is gradually 
following a low-carbon development pattern.  
 
Also Yong et al. (2016) and Cucchiella et. al. (2015; 2017) explore and examine the greening of (energy) 
production. Yong et al. (2016, p.1) argue that “cleaner energy is the cornerstone for cleaner production”, stating 
that environmental impacts should be minimized through net-regenerative development should be the 
overarching aim. Cucchiella et al. (2017) find that each renewable source has its own profitability, and that 
incentives are particularly necessary only in specific cases e.g. to sustain photovoltaic technology.  
 
Mining, anyway, remains 
, we also argue that lignite mining firms must go beyond that and sustainably de-growth in order to meet the 
objective of zero emissions by 2030-2050, as set by the Paris Convention (2014). The conditions for 
sustainable de-growth has been widely discussed in the Journal of Cleaner Production (e.g. Rommel et al. 
2016; Schneider et al.; 2010; Sekulova et al., 2013). Schneider et al. (2010, p. 511) define sustainable de-
growth “as an equitable downscaling of production and consumption that increases human well-being and 
enhances ecological conditions at the local and global level, in the short and long term“, criticizing the green 
economy as it often implies the development of ‘greener’ industries without necessarily replacing traditionally 
polluting industries. In this paper, we illustrate a precondition for un-sustainable forms of energy generation 
based on nuclear and coal exploitation; henceforth more sustainable mining appears to be a necessity 
(Bebbington 2014, Pimentel et al. 2016). Govindan et al (2014) state that “sustainable mining practices are a 
must”, arguing that social responsible mining could only be achieved by engaging with and involving multiple 
stakeholders including governmental, media, and societal associations. Pimentel et (p. 2145) argue that “a 
nation's mineral resources can only generate prosperity if specific technology assets are employed in a way as 
to effectively develop its resource sector, capture value from it, and transform that value into long-term 
benefits”, although they identify important gaps in operations and waste management, mine closure and 
rehabilitation. Bebbington (2014) states that “socio-environmental conflict presents mining companies with 
the chance to engage in vital discussions on the relationships between development, democracy and the 
environment”.  
 
While we agree with the last statement, the case of Germany shows that an increasing share of renewable 
energy and equally an expanding coal production are quite common to find in developed economies. Germany 
energy transition, with its wide range of community renewable energy projects to the de-growth movement, 
“serves as an international showcase for the transition of a large industrialized economy to a low-carbon energy 
system”, and bears little evidence of a general change in attitudes towards technology, consumption, or equity. 
(Rommel et al, 2016 p. 1).  
 
In light of these considerations, we challenge the notion of de-growth in the German energy sector, arguing 
that it is simply a case of green growth without any significant replacement of lignite mining and coal fired 
energy production. Moreover, we investigate the struggle of various society groups to achieve a low carbon 
economy, and a more equitable society. In particular, we explore the geographies of socio-environmental 
conflicts, identifying different types of conflicts, environmental activism and movements, roots and causes of 
activism. These are analysed with regard to role of the German government and state-owned companies in 
light of a transition towards a low carbon economy. In addition, the study explores disinvestment and equitable 
de-growth in mining and energy production from the perspective of (state owned) companies in rich 
industrialized countries, providing options for policymakers for equitable and effective transitions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 History of high carbon economy, energy policy, and historical inequalities in Germany 
 
In Germany, mining activities extracting lignite increased significantly with the advent of the National 
Socialist government in 1933. Output passed from 120 million tons in the early 1930s to 250 million tons in 
1942 (Heinrich-Böll Stiftung and BUND, 2015). As part of its autarky policy, the government forced industrial 
installations to convert lignite into petrol needed for the (planned) war, which employed forced labor of tens 
of thousands men and women (Holdinghausen, 2015). After the fall of National Socialism, in both the Federal 
Republic of Germany (GFR; or West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR; or East 
Germany) the achievement of an equitable society became a raison d'être. West Germany promoted the 
economic model Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy; Abelshauser 2004), while policy in East 
Germany makers intended to achieve social equitability by the ideological values and goals of official 
Marxism-Leninism, promoting an equitable access to the social surplus (Artz et al, 2006). East Germany 
promoted self-sufficiency and own lignite resources covered two thirds of primary energy demand (Nawrocki, 
1981); whereas in West Germany imported resources (mainly oil) covered 60% of energy use (Petschow et 
al., 1990). 
 
In West Germany, environmental activism and related movements appeared in the early 1970s, due to growing 
concerns among the population associated with the escalation of the nuclear conflict and the oil crisis (Rink, 
2002). Although West Germany had large mining sites of both hard coal and lignite in Rhine-Ruhr and Rhenish 
areas respectively, the environmental movement in the country in mid-1980s focused on other conflicts such 
as dying forests (Waldsterben) and the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe (occurred in 1986). These facts saw a 
surge of protests against nuclear power stations, waste transport and storage (Lauber and Mez, 2004). By the 
end of the 1980s, the environmental movement in West Germany could celebrate some wins due to the 
implementation by the government of more stringent environmental policies. 
 
The situation in East Germany was worse. In 1970, the country adopted a new environmental 
legislation to address issues such as pollution and forestry destruction, while Western countries only reached 
this standard much later and more reluctantly. The aim was to protect the environment as part of the class 
struggle and to prove the long-term superiority of socialism, since capitalism was unable to solve 
environmental problems. However, at the end of the 1970s, East Germany’s socialist environmental policy 
came under severe criticism of oppositional groups. Many regions of East Germany were in a permanent state 
of ecological emergency. Uranium mining in Erzgebirge (border to Czechoslovakia), lignite coal mining in 
Lusatia (Brandenburg/Saxony) Southern Leipzig Area, and heavy chemical industry in the Leipzig-Halle-
Bitterfeld were all characterized by outdated and economically inefficient production facilities which created 
much environmental damage. In these areas, there were basically no flowing waters and lakes left ecologically 
intact. Protests started against air pollution and intensive mining, with more than 60 environmental 
organisations targeting misinformation campaigns operated by the East German government merged. The 
ecological crisis was one of the main factors of wave the mass protests which saw the East German 
environmental movement playing a major part in the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 (Rink, 2002, 
Metzger et al., 2007). Years later, the Western Green Party absorbed the Eastern German opposition movement 
Bündnis 90 (Association 90) on the assumption that the two would jointly represent a broader power base with 
regard to environmental issues. Former activists under socialism were now part of a party machinery 
embedded in German “realpolitik”, and no longer acting as representatives of eastern German grassroots civil 
society. Some of the initial goals of a more equitable society, embedded in a German third way comprising 
Western capitalism and Eastern socialism, went progressively diluted in day-to-day political life (Herrschel 
and Forsyth, 2001).  
 
2.2 Spectrum of sustainability related lignite mining conflicts 
 
Lignite mining conflicts have been identified in many countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(2013), China (Miao and Marrs, 2000), Czech Republic (Frantál, 2016), Ireland (Leonard, 2008), India 
(Martinez-Alier et al., 2016), Nigeria (Olorode, 1998), Pakistan (Makki and Van Vuuren, 2015) Poland 
(Badera, and Kocoń, 2014), Romania (Popović et al. 2015), Serbia (Đukičin et al. 2014), Slovakia 
(Skvarekova, Kozakova 2012), Spain (Villar 2010; Zafrilla, 2014), Thailand (Fovsyth, 2004; Middleton, 
2012), Turkey (Yaylacı and Düzgün, 2016), US (Montrie, 2003).  
 
Badera, and Kocoń (2014) investigate lignite mining conflicts in Poland. They find that most 
inhabitants could not assess the mining company's environmental impact assessments and did not know if 
legal requirements for public participation in the decision process were sufficient. In his investigation on Czech 
lignite-mining areas Frantal (2016) finds that a strong place attachment that is characterized by the quality of 
living environment and the duration of residence proved to be important predictor of anti-coal attitude. Typical 
lignite opponents have a higher age, university degree and a strong place attachment. Villar (2010) investigates 
a conflict involving a large agrarian revolt in Francoist Spain, which started after the expropriation of local 
farmers’ land for the exploitation of lignite. For the author, this conflict shows how ecological politics may 
operate as a critique of capitalist exploitation, highlighting  the link between the tradition of anti-Franco 
struggle, and the affirmation of peripheral cultural identities in the political context of the 1970s. Middleton 
(2012) reports 30.000 displaced, 200 dead and 600 with serious health problems due to lignite mining and 
related power generation in Thailand. Fovsyth (2004) argues that social movements in Thailand have failed to 
avoid serious damage to human and environmental health. While concerns on lignite extraction in Thailand 
have increasingly become discursive structures into which new forms of activism have shaped, there is also 
evidence of several filed lawsuits local communities have won in their struggles against lignite mining, with 
projects cancelled and many residents receiving compensation (Middleton, 2012). Broto (2013), in his study 
of conflicts caused by the environmental impacts of  lignite mining industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, finds 
that a ‘working class’ status for local residents limit their capacity to cope with pollution, and has a significant 
detrimental impact on the social and political relationships between the industry and local residents.  
Despite this broad international review of contested lignite-mining areas, little or no research has been 
conducted on socio-environmental conflicts lignite mining in Germany. Although there is a large body of 
literature investigating mining and post-mining landscapes from the lens of ecology (e.g. Grünewald 2001; 
Hüttl and Weber, 2001) or economics (e.g. Koch et al. 2005; Lienhoop and Messner 2009) integrated, 
interdisciplinary political ecology - or ecological economics based explorations are still rare. This is surprising 
because mining activity has been a source of concerns, conflict and confrontation for many years. Germany, 
with its strong green policy and low carbon path, existing movements and social struggles should find more 
sustainably its way into academic debates on de-growth, low-carbon economy, green economy, and commons. 
 
 
2.3 Theoretical background 
 
There is an increasing body of literature investigating the regional low-carbon economy in high polluting 
countries and industries (e.g. Robertson, 2015; Walz, 2011; Zhang et al., 2015). While the studies have a 
cutting edge present day perspective, it seems worthwhile to investigate historical examples of emissions 
intensive countries that has opted for emission reduction. The fact that China as a modern day unitary socialist 
one-party state is in the focus of research makes it interesting to investigate further socialist high carbon 
economies. Being the top lignite mining country in the world the GDR was comparable to present day 
neoextractivist countries (Acosta, 2013; Dougherty and Olsen, 2014; Gudynas 2009) such as Bolivia, Ecuador 
or Venezuela. Although East Germany implemented a new type of extractivism as part of advancing socialism, 
the social and environmental impacts remained unaltered; as a consequence, the conditions associated with 
extractive activities in the country generally deteriorated. The East German government was unable to find a 
strategy to enable the buen vivir (“living well”) and to take advantage of non-renewable natural resources, 
turning them into a premium. The regional ecological emergency led to environmental injustice, with people 
living in contaminated areas having a much lower life expectancy and manifold higher risk of cancer and other 
serious diseases. 
 
In West Germany particularly due to the strong environmental movement and environmental protection 
granted by government policies, the situation was much better than in the East. However, in West Germany 
and in the reunited present day Germany, policy makers have bought into the concept of ecological 
modernization (Jänicke, 2008; 2012), which proposes growth and environmental protection at the same time. 
Green Economy is not more than a new name for this old concept (Lorek and Spangenberg, 2014). 
 
3. Methodology and data analysis 
 
 For the purpose of this study, we approached 18 experts in the fields of environment, ecology and 
economics. The need for a multidisciplinary methodology was acknowledged during discussions held by 
authors with peers at several symposiums organised in the field. Among the numerous available methods for 
working with experts (Fink et al. 1984; Jacobs 1995; Olson and Rueter 1987), we selected Delphi due to its 
methodical, transparent and well known approach (Bryman, 2006). Delphi is a method for organizing a group 
communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of persons to deal with complex 
problems (Linstone and Turoff 1975), and it is appropriate to analyse qualitative information based on diverse 
attitudes and complex concepts (MacMillan and Marshall 2006).  
 
Selected experts were invited to an event to discuss and debate on issues and challenges related to 
environmental conflicts in Germany1. These conflicts arise from structural inequalities related to income and 
power whereby individuals engage in place-based struggles (EJOLT 2016). Participants were chosen due to 
their recognized record of commitment to (and concern in) decision-making/managerial roles, as well as in 
relation to their academic roles in sustainability. The purpose of the Delphi study was to explore geographies 
of socio-environmental conflicts based on the expertise of participants. All experts possessed a deep 
understanding of the historic and present-day issues of sustainable and unsustainable development in Germany 
and related conflicts.  
 
The event was recorded/analysed to extract new knowledge in order to identify and map environmental 
conflicts in Germany in the past 30 years. Experts were provided with some information on the general purpose 
extracted from the EJOLT project. Specifically, the following classification of environmental conflicts: (i) 
Nuclear, (ii) Mineral Ores and Building Materials Extraction, (iii) Waste Management, (iv) Biomass and Land 
Conflicts (Forests, Agriculture and Livestock Management), (v) Fossil Fuels and Climate Justice/Energy, (vi) 
Water management, (vii) Infrastructure and Built Environment, (viii) Tourism Recreation, (ix) Biodiversity 
Conservation Conflicts, and (x) Industrial and Utilities Conflicts. In addition, knowledge on several global 
environmental conflicts (such as those identified in the such as Yasuni-ITT project.2) was shared with experts 
prior to the event. 
 
The Delphi method recognizes the human judgement as a legitimate input to research (Cornish, 1977), so 
conflicts were discussed openly. Since the collective judgement of several informed people is likely to be better 
than the judgement of a single individual (Cornish, 1977). The discussion served to gain in-depth insights on 
                                                 
1 The 18 experts were approached in July 2015. Their backgrounds varied within a wide range, including academia, business and 
entrepreneurship, NGO activisms and civil society. 
2 In this project Ecuador offered a perpetual suspension of oil extraction in part of the Yasuni National Park in return for payments of 
the international community. 
environmental conflicts and roots and causes of environmental movements and activism.  
 
At the end of the event, the experts and activists explored the geographies of socio-environmental conflicts 
in Germany. The distribution of these identified environmental conflicts (n=117) is shown in Figure 1. Most 
of the current environmental conflicts are happening in North Rhine Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria. 
However, these are relatively large and densely populated states; hence a higher frequency of conflicts within 
their boundaries is somehow expected. Figure 2 shows the different types of conflicts across sectors. Most 
conflicts (46) are related to fossil fuels and climate justice/energy, followed by infrastructure and built 
environment (15), biodiversity conservation conflicts (14), and biomass and land conflicts (14). 
 
Figure 1: Environmental conflicts in the German States from 1990 to 2015 (n=117, no environmental conflict was 
identified in states: Bremen, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland) 
 
(Source: own investigation) 
 
Figure 2: Type of environmental conflict (n=117) 
 
(Source: own investigation) 
 
4. Discussion 
 
According to the experts consulted in our analysis, most of socio-environmental conflicts in Germany are 
directly related to the Low-Carbon Economy. Of these conflicts, 26 cases (Fossil Fuels/ Energy 40-65 in 
Appendix) are fracking conflicts occurred mainly in the North and Northwest of Germany since mid-2000s. 
Due to lower oil prices and more stringent government policies towards fracking, these conflicts have eased 
to some degree. Nine lignite mining conflicts (Fossil Fuels/ Energy 31-39) were identified, four in Western 
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and five in Eastern Germany. Local resident groups, environmental justice organisations (EJOs) and other civil 
society groups are exposed to unsustainable means of energy production (Grüne Liga, 2016). Forms of active 
resistance appeared already at the time of the GDR, mostly in the Southern Leipzig mining area, where several 
towns versed in a state of environmental emergency (Beleites, 2016). The environmental movement played an 
important role in the peaceful revolution of 1989/90, in which the city of Leipzig, with the weekly Monday 
demonstrations, was the centre. In more rural Lusatia there was much less visible but still existing resistance 
against lignite mining especially in the Cottbus Nord (Fossil Fuels/ Energy 35) mining area. Until its very end, 
the socialist regime coal opponents were jailed and local communities such as in Lakoma were dispossessed. 
After the peaceful change of 1989/1990 mining assets were privatized and rent seeking behaviour let to a new 
wave of mining development, devastating landscapes, and dispossessing local communities.  
 
In 1994 the local government of Brandenburg decided to extend the Jänschwalde lignite mine to the Sorbian 
(a slavic minority) village of Horno. This decision led to protests (Fossil Fuels/ Energy 34) and several (lost) 
court cases. The takeover of Lusatian mining sites and power generation by the Swedish government owned 
firm Vattenfall (in 2001), and related debates in the Swedish parliament, did not generate any positive outcome 
for Horno: local residents were resettled, and those resisting dispossessed in 2004. After Horno, Vattenfall 
proposed three new mining sides in Jaenschwalde-Nord (Fossil Fuels/ Energy 33), Welzow-Sued II (Fossil 
Fuels/ Energy 37) and Nochten II (Fossil Fuels/ Energy 36). While local governments in Brandenburg and 
Saxony supported these projects, the broader environment for lignite mining has changed.  
 
After the Swedish elections in September 2014, a red-green coalition came to power with the aim to disinvest 
from Vattenfall and its high carbon-led operations. In April 2016 mining activities and related power stations 
were sold for at a loss to a consortium of two Czech companies (approval from Swedish government still 
needed, 2016). The divestment of Vattenfall from its lignite mining business can be considered as a case of 
corporate de-growth, even though the environmental repercussions for industrial firms remain unclear both 
socially and economically, since selling the mining assets resulted in no CO2 mitigation. In Czech Republic, 
the consortium is likely to face less stakeholder pressure aimed at a greening of production and more 
sustainable business models. Greenpeace made a bid for the mining assets of Vattenfall in October 2015 but 
was excluded by the selling bank (Citigroup). It did not offer money in the hope to transfer the operations into 
a sustainable business model, a charitable foundation supported by Vattenfall and both the German and 
Swedish governments, to phase out from lignite by 2030. However, similar to the Yasuni ITT case in Ecuador, 
where the state demanded money from the international community, this process failed due to lack of support 
from the international community. Both the German and Swedish governments shown relatively little support 
for this equitable solution. As a result, the level of social conflict in the area increased, including occupation 
of Welzow lignite mine (DW, 2016). Resistance against mining has shifted from a more local focus with 
farmers and local populations struggling to maintain their livelihood to a global, environmental justice oriented 
movement (Breakfree, 2016). 
 
Before disinvesting from Lusatian mining and power generation Vattenfall already started to consider 
greener production and more sustainable business models. Since the mid-2000s, it invested in carbon capture 
and storage technology, then accepted and supported many organisations including the IPCC (Metz et al., 
2005). However, several initiatives promoted by local resident groups and EJOs resisted a number of pilot 
projects proposed by Vattenfall and other companies (Fossil Fuels/ Energy 66-71), fearing that carbon leakages 
and high levels of energy intensity associated with the technology could generate more CO2 emissions. Similar 
fears were shared by the German government too.  
 
In the end, CCS/ Vattenfall ceased its research and development activities in this field due to high costs and 
increased energy use. Increasing levels of resistance and discontent can be registered against new coal fired 
power stations (Fossil Fuels/ Energy 72-75), with local residents groups and EJOs opposing high carbon 
technology in their neighbourhoods. This situation highlights a contradiction within the German energy policy, 
which includes opting energy turnaround and on the same time sticking on lignite/ hard coal. Out of the EU 
28 countries, only the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Luxembourg exceed Germany’s per capita CO2 emissions 
(Eurostat 2016). In the two German largest cities of Berlin and Hamburg, local residents groups and EJOs are 
campaigning for a re-nationalisation of energy supply (Industrial and Utilities 76, 77). 
 
By privatizing energy supply or selling it to foreign state owned companies (e.g. Vattenfall as in the 
case of Berlin and Hamburg), city and town councils lose their control over energy transition goals, the 
greening of energy production, and carbon intensity of regional economy. Finally, rent seeking behaviour of 
international utility companies seem to have exacerbated the problem of energy poverty in Germany, although 
more than 20 percent of the electricity price for households is attributable to the Renewable Energy Act 
(BDEW, 2016) given a guaranteed feed in tariff (introduced in 2000 to improve efficiency of renewable energy 
and transition to a low carbon economy). In 2015, 30.1% of the total gross electricity production came from 
renewable energy sources in 2015 (Destatis, 2016). Despite its positive effects related low-carbon economy, 
greening of energy production, energy transition, and green economy, it has caused environmental injustice 
and inequality (Weber, 2014).  
 
Firstly, there is an unequal distribution of costs between industry and households. While industry uses 45.6% 
of electricity, it pays only 31.4% while private households use only 26.2% and pay 35.2% (Agentur für 
Erneuerbare Energien, 2014). Several energy intensive industries such as food, chemicals, paper, metal, and 
glass are generally excluded or receive large reductions. Secondly, electricity costs have more than doubled 
since the introduction of the Renewable Energy Act. Even though there is no official definition of energy 
poverty in Germany, it is widely accepted that a household is considered as “energiearm” (energy poor) if 
energy costs for living are higher than 10% of the net income (Diekmann, 2014). In 2011, about 6.9 million 
households (17% ot total) met this criteria, with households with an average income of 900€/month spending 
about 93€ in energy costs (Diekmann, 2014). Thirdly, the access to benefits of the feed-in tariff is distributed 
unevenly between rural and urban (poor) population. Tenants in poorer suburban areas have very limited 
possibility to benefit from feed-in tariffs as they have no facilities to install renewable energy such as 
photovoltaic. Lastly, many of these tenants are threatened by ecological renewal of neighbourhoods and 
energetic rehabilitation of buildings. This leads to additional rent increases and growing resistance against 
gentrification (Infrastructure 79, 80). 
 
Renewable energy is predominantly produced in the rural wind-rich areas of Northern Germany, while energy 
usage is higher in the industrialized South. That is why network providers and policy makers have proposed 
new high voltage energy power lines, provoking protests and resistance in the middle (Thuringia) and south 
(Bavaria) of the country (Biodiversity Conservation, 5, 6; Infrastructure 84). Environmental NGO’s, citizens’ 
initiatives and other stakeholders criticize these large infrastructure projects, concerned about the effects of 
electrical and electromagnetic fields to human health and protection of nature and landscapes. Furthermore 
environmental justice organisations argue that energy grid should be expanded and developed according to the 
expansion of renewable energies, and not the other way around. Similarly, pumped storage power plants had 
been proposed in Thuringia, Baden-Württemberg, and Bavaria and faced resistance from Citizens’ Initiatives 
and the local Green Party representatives (Biodiversity Conservation, 7-10). This type of hydroelectric storage 
is considered to be necessary for the energy transition in times when supply of renewable energy from sunlight 
and wind is reduced. High voltage energy power lines, and pumped storage power plants show a typical pattern 
of German policymaking towards the so called “Green Economy”. It seems that there is a unilateral focus on 
“Green Growth” by development of clean technology, its implementation and exports. Local residents and 
environmental justice organizations are questioning this approach and highlight that many of these technical 
solutions are actually related to increased energy use, CO2 emissions and material flow. A more balanced 
promotion of renewable energy focusing on photovoltaic rather than wind would diminish the imbalance 
between North and South of the country, but also the apparent necessity of new High-Voltage Power Lines. 
And indeed, there is an increasing resistance again wind energy in Bavaria but also at the North Sea Cost and 
other regions (Biodiversity Conservation, 2-4). Citizens’ initiatives ally with often conservative governments 
to resist wind energy due to concerns related to biodiversity and landscape conservation but also for a more 
balanced renewable energy generation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The analysis presented in this paper illustrates how Germany has, over the past 30 years, both resisted and 
rearticulated its position towards a high-carbon economy, serving its energy needs through the destruction of 
its own environment. Using a comparative Delphi study over many years, we explored and examined the roles 
of the German government and state-owned companies in the light of the transition towards a low carbon 
economy. Furthermore, we addressed the contradictions of a Green Economy strategy. By focussing on growth 
and prosperity by the development of renewable energy technology that is to be sold in Germany as well as in 
other countries. Besides its intended effects of increase of renewable energy production, it also generated 
several negative effects. So far, it has not led to a significant decrease of CO2 emissions related to energy 
production and usage (Destatis, 2016; Umweltbundesamt, 2015; Umweltbundesamt, 2016). Instead, it seems 
to have helped the development large projects such as High-Voltage Power Lines or pumped storage power 
plants which resulted significantly unpopular. The resistance of various stakeholder groups at local level 
(including CI’s and EJO’s) has prevented most of these projects, although they also revealed the nature of “red 
herring” (Spash, 2012) and “Wolf in Sheep’s clothing” (Lander, 2011) attached to the Green Economy. Just a 
few months before the Fukushima accidents in 2011 the German government (re-)invented the 30 years old 
idea of Energiewende, which includes withdrawing from both lignite and nuclear energy. However, despite 
these ambitious plans the government has not smoothed the return of lignite power generation. In many 
German towns and cities, citizen’s initiatives, and environmental justice organisations have resisted lignite 
mining and related power generation, but also power-related projects deemed necessary to develop an energy 
economy based on renewable energy. 
 
Despite Energiewende, lignite related CO2 emissions in Germany were 4% higher in 2014 compared to 2010 
(Sandbag, 2015). Government support has led renewable energies undercutting relatively climate-friendly 
natural gas on prices, pushing utilities to turn towards carbon intensive coal instead (Economist, 2014). 
Subsides for renewable energy are paid by the households according to the German Renewable Energies Act 
(EEG). Electricity prices for households have increased by 100% in the last 15 years (Statista 2016), increasing 
energy poverty especially in densely populated urban areas, where inhabitants have little possibility to install 
subsidized wind power or solar energy installations. Conversely, the mining extraction frontier continues to 
expand in rural Germany, wiping villages and farmland off the map. Despite these contradictions and 
inconsistencies, German policymakers seem to be committed towards a low-carbon economy which consider 
the needs of various industry stakeholders. These situation create the conditions for environmental conflicts, 
general disagreement and misalignment among different actors within the German society over the use of 
resources. In many environmental conflicts, individuals or groups disagree with the level of carbon emissions 
associated with local projects, escalating until entire communities engage in place-based struggles. 
 
Our paper has some limitations. First, the applied Delphi study used a categorisation of different environmental 
conflicts (e.g. fossil fuels, nuclear) which might have discouraged the identification of conceivable conflicts 
on other areas related to sustainability. Nevertheless, the Delphi method enabled us to combine the knowledge 
and abilities of a group of experts to address socio-environmental conflicts, for which both qualitative and 
quantitative empirical evidence are rare. A second limitation resides on the fact that, even though experts came 
from all over Germany, there is a certain bias among regions in terms of identifying socio-environmental 
conflicts. This seems be due to the emphasis of conflicts related to the so-called ‘decarbonisation’ of Germany. 
As a result, other socio-environmental conflicts and region with less fossil fuel mining and related power 
generation may be underrepresented. Further research should address these gaps in literature. In particular, a 
large scale survey could provide a more comprehensive view of geographies of socio-environmental conflicts, 
and give more evidence on the roots and causes of environmental movements and activism.  
Finally, a scalar variation of identified conflicts seems needed in order to increase our knowledge in 
the field. Our results provide no weighting or scale about the different conflicts. The difference in scale may 
be addressed in a further study that explores the connotation of the environmental conflicts for environmental 
movements and activism. This may be done by developing a discourse analysis addressing the media coverage 
of the different environmental conflicts. 
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Appendix: 
 
Nr. Location Region  Type of conflict Groups EJOLT ConflictType X* 
1 Kyritz-Ruppin Brandenb. Contra bombing range 
 
Biodiv. Conservation  2 
2 Bavaria Bavaria Contra wind energy 
 
Biodiv. Conservation 1 
3 Merzen L.Saxony Contra wind energy CI’s Biodiv. Conservation 1 
4 Bayreuth/ Bavaria Mega Electricity Grid Local CI Biodiv. Conservation 1 
5 Schmalwasser Thuringia Pumped-storage power Local CI Biodiv. Conservation 2 
6 Schweinbach Thuringia Pumped-storage power Local CI Biodiv. Conservation 2 
7 Atdorf  Baden W.. Pumped-storage power Local CI Biodiv. Conservation 1 
8 Bad Tölz Bavaria Pumped-storage power Local CI Biodiv. Conservation 2 
9 Wattenmeer L.Saxony National park, drilling of oil BUND, WWF, fishers, farmers Biodiv. Conservation 1 
10 Lagoon area  MWP Waive National Park BUND, fishers, forestry Biodiv. Conservation 1 
11 N.Black-Forest Baden-W Designation National Park NABU, BUND, GP, CI Biodiv. Conservation 1 
12 BavarianForest Bavaria Recolonisation of Lynxes WWF, ÖJV Biodiv. Conservation 1 
13 Nandus MWP Mega Neobita Nabu, farmers association Biodiv. Conservation 1 
14 Westerland Schlesw.H Offshore Windpark CI Headwind Sylt Biodiv. Conservation 1 
15 Lauchstädt Thuringia Mega Electricity Grid Municipalities, Thuringia, CI’s Biodiv. Conservation 1 
16 Elbtalaue  L.Saxony Declaration National Park BUND, Farmers Association Biodiv. Conservation 1 
17 Magdeburg Saxony A. Genetically modified crops CI Contra GMO Biomass and Land 2 
18 Giessen Hesse Genetically modified crops  CI Gendreck Weg(ContraGMO) Biomass and Land 2 
19 Groß Lüsewitz M.W.P Genetically modified crops CI Gendreck Weg(ContraGMO) Biomass and Land  2 
20 Strausberg Brandenb. Genetically modified crops  CI Gendreck Weg(ContraGMO) Biomass and Land 2 
21 Brandenb. Brandenb. Landgrabbing 
 
Biomass and Land 1 
22 Freiburg Baden W. Use of pesticides PAN (Pesticide Action Network)  Biomass and Land 1 
23 Großenknete L.Saxony Impacts of factory farming  CI MUT (People, Flora, Fauna) Biomass and Land 1 
24 Mecklenburg M.W.P. Impacts of factory farming CI No Agrarian Factories Biomass and Land 1 
25 Holzminden L.Saxony Impacts of factory farming CI No Agrarian Factories Biomass and Land 1 
26 Salzwedel Saxony A. Impacts of factory farming CI No Agrarian Factories Biomass and Land 1 
27 Rostock M.W.P. Impacts of factory farming CI No Agrarian Factories Biomass and Land  1 
28 Emsland L.Saxony Impacts of factory farming CI No Agrarian Factories Biomass and Land 1 
29 Wietze L.Saxony Impacts of factory farming CIs, Animal welfare, GP, BUND Biomass and Land 1 
30 Schlesw. H Schlesw.H Privatization of forests CI Forest Alliance, BUND,Nabu Biomass and Land  1 
31 Garzweiler I N.R.W. Contra lignite mining BUND Fossil Fuels /Energy 2 
32 Garzweiler II N.R.W. Contra lignite mining BUND/ Fossil Fuels /Energy 2 
33 Jänschwalde-N Brandenb. Contra lignite mining GP, BUND  Fossil Fuels /Energy 4 
34 Jänschwalde Brandenb. Contra lignite mining GP, BUND Fossil Fuels /Energy 4 
35 Cottbus Nord Brandenb. Contra lignite mining GP, BUND Fossil Fuels /Energy 4 
36 Nochten II Saxony Contra lignite mining Left/Green Party, BUND, Nabu Fossil Fuels /Energy 4 
37 Welzow Süd Brandenb. Contra lignite mining Green League, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 4 
38 Buir N.R.W. Contra lignite mining CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
39 Hambach N.R.W. Contra lignite mining Bund, CI out of coal Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
40 Drensteinfurt N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
41 Hamm N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
42 Werne N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
43 Herbern N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
44 Witten N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels/Energy 5 
45 Isselburg N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
46 Kleve N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
47 Hochsauerland N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
48 Mülheim N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
49 Aachen, Jülich N.R.W. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
50 Intschede L.Saxony Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
51 Rotenburg L.Saxony Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
52 Braunschweig L.Saxony Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
53 Wolfenbüttel L.Saxony Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
54 Lüneburg L.Saxony Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
55 Usedom M.W.P. Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
56 Hamburg Hamburg Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
57 Auenland Schlesw.H Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
58 Lauenburg Schlesw.H Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
59 Saal M.W.P. Contra fracking CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
60 Kassel Hesse Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
61 Korbach Hesse Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
62 Unstrut Thuringia Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
63 Fahner Höhe Thuringia Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
64 Weiden Bavaria Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
65 Völkersen L.Saxony Contra fracking Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
66 Brandenb. Brandenb. CCS CI No CCS Fossil Fuels /Energy 2 
67 Nehmten Schlesw.H CCS Nabu, BUND, GP, CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 5 
68 North Sea  L.Saxony CCS in the Sea CI  Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
69 Mueritz Park M.W.P. CCS CI No Gas below Gras Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
74 Altmark Saxony A. CCS CI No CO2 Repository Altmark Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
75 Nordfriesland Schlesw.H CCS CI No CO2 Repository Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
70 Hamburg Hamburg Coal fired power plant  CI, Robin Wood Fossil Fuels /Energy 2 
72 Datteln IV N.R.W. Coal fired power plant  
 
Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
73 Wilhelmshaven L.Saxony Coal fired power plant  CI Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
76 Lubmin M.W.P. Coal fired power plant CIs Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
66 Hamburg Hamburg District heating piping Robinwood, CI Countercurrent Fossil Fuels /Energy 1 
77 Hamburg Hamburg Renationalization energy Nabu,BUND, GP, Robin Wood Industrial and Utilities 1 
78 Berlin  Berlin  Renationalization energy 
 
Industrial and Utilities 2 
79 Berlin  Berlin  Contra Tempelhof  
 
Infrastructure 3 
80 Berlin  Berlin  Contra Mediaspree project 
 
Infrastructure 2 
81 Halle/ Saale Saxony A. A 143 Saale valley Nabu Infrastructure 1 
82 Leipzig Saxony Nato hub/ night flights CI Infrastructure 1 
83 Dresden Saxony Construction of bridge Green league Infrastructure 3 
84 Franconia Bavaria Mega electricity grid 
 
Infrastructure 1 
85 Stuttgart  Baden W. Tunnel + train station CIs Infrastructure 1 
86 Muenchen Bavaria Application for Olympia CIs, NGOs Infrastructure 1 
87 Frankfurt Hesse Enlargement airport CIs, BUND  Infrastructure 2 
88 Munich Airport Bavaria Enlargement airport CIs, BUND Infrastructure 2 
89 Berlin Airport Berlin  New airport, flight routes,  CIs Infrastructure  1 
90 Berlin Berlin  Stop motorway CI STOP A 100 Infrastructure 1 
91 Dresden-Usti Saxony Stop motorway Deti Zeme (Kinder der Erde) Infrastructure 1 
92 Fehmarn Schlesw.H Stop bridge Baltic Sea CI, VCD, Green/ Left Party Infrastructure 1 
93 Bad Segeberg Schlesw.H Enlargement motorway Nabu, BUND Infrastructure 1 
94 Gorleben L.Saxony Contra suclear storage GP, BUND, CI Nuclear 4 
95 Hamburg Hamburg Atom-Transport-Port 
 
Nuclear 1 
96 Gronau N.R.W. Uranium enrichment plant CI Radiated Nuclear 2 
97 Jülich N.R.W. Nuclear waste as fuel CI Radiated Nuclear 1 
98 Wackersdorf  Bavaria Nuclear reprocessing CI Nuclear 2 
99 Ahaus N.R.W. Interim nuclear storage CIs Nuclear 1 
100 Stade L.Saxony Decommissioned plant  CIs Nuclear 1 
101 Neckarwestheim Baden W. Decommissioned plant CIs Nuclear 1 
102 Asse L.Saxony Nuclear waste storage CIs Nuclear 1 
103 Brokdorf Schlesw.H Nuclear power plant CI, Anti-Nuclear-Movement Nuclear 1 
104 Kalkar N.R.W. Nuclear Power Station CI, Anti-Nuclear Movement, Nuclear 1 
105 Sudelfeld Bavaria Snow cannons,water use Alpine Association (DAV), CI Tourism Recreation 1 
106 Bad Schandau Saxony Climber sandstone rocks Climber Association (SBB) Tourism Recreation 1 
107 Halle/ Saale Saxony A. Toxic waste in old mines 2 CIs Waste Management 1 
108 Ruhr Area N.R.W. Toxic waste in old mines C Waste Management 1 
109 Potsdam Brandenb. Renationalization water  CI Water management 1 
110 Berlin  Berlin  Renationalization of water CI Berlin Water Table Water management 2 
111 Saxony-Anhalt,  Saxony A. Elbe river regulation 
 
Water management 1 
112 Hamburg Hamburg deepening of Elbe river 
 
Water management 1 
113 Saale Saxony A. River regulation BUND Water management 1 
114 Hamburg Hamburg Water use for power plant Citizen Initiative, NGOs  Water management 1 
115 Straubing,  Bavaria River regulation BUND,Heritage NGO,Churches  Water management 1 
116 Altmühltal Bavaria River regulation BUND Water management 1 
117 Blankenese Hamburg Filling Elbe river for Airbus CI Muehlenberg, Bund, Nabu Water management 1 
* times mentioned by different experts 
CI(s)= Citizens’ Initiative(s), GP = Greenpeace, BUND = German Federation for the Environment and Nature Conservation (Friends of 
the Earth Germany), Nabu = Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union 
 
